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Introduction
By the end of 20th century, with the end of the Cold War, globalization, economic liberalization, systemic financial crises, technological advances and the rise of transnational activism, many analysts talked about "a new foreign policy", more open to topics that used to be considered "low politics" and non-state actors participation in the decision-making process (Milani and Pinheiro, 2013) .
Affected by the changes in the international system and by domestic transformations, the foreign policy decision-making process in Brazil could no longer be understood as isolated, where the Foreign Affairs Ministry (Itamaraty) had the monopoly of decisions (Milani and Pinheiro, 2013; Pinheiro, 2009; Farias and Ramazini Júnior, 2010) . The greater relevance of several actors, both state and non-state, contributed to the need to broaden the channels for dialogue with other sectors, in particular, the civil society. Actors such as companies, nonprofit organizations, the media and social movements act internationally, developing sophisticated action plans.
In short, as Milani and Pinheiro stated: "Foreign policy is a public policy, since institutional, social and economic factors treat it in this perspective; it lacks, however, an institutional framework that reflects this new configuration politically " (2013:28) . Undoubtedly, creating mechanisms that include civil society actors in the formulation process would democratize the discussion forums of Brazilian foreign policy.
It is important to emphasize, however, that these "are actors of international relations, developing, with objectives and goals defined by them, actions at the international level, but we do not call those actions foreign policy" (Milani and Pinheiro, 2013: 21) . In that sense, it is important to recognize the importance of non-state actors as influencers on foreign policy, without detracting from the fact that "the responsibility for the public policies is of the government that implements them" (Milani and Pinheiro, 2013: 27) .
Finally, it is important to remember that the democratization of the decision-making process of Brazilian foreign policy is also beneficial to the country from an international point of view. Milani and Pinheiro understand that "if, on the one hand, the greater participation of actors in the process of defining the country's choices internationally displaces the Itamaraty from the exclusive center of decisions, plurality renews the country's international insertion credentials by qualifying foreign policy as representative of the broader interests of the nation" (2013: 31-32 ).
This paper argues that foreign policy is a public policy, and therefore, should include in its decision-making process the actors present in civil society. In that sense, it seeks to better understand the impact of Human Rights NGOs in Brazilian foreign policy. More specifically, the focus is to investigate how NGOs pressured Brazilian diplomacy during the Lula's administration (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , using shaming not only as a strategy to place Human Rights violating governments under the spotlight, but also as a tool for criticizing states considered allies of those regimes. Brazil during the Lula administration is an interesting case, specially because of the South-South cooperation discourse used in the country's diplomatic agenda, directly connected to the development and Human Rights (social, economics and cultural) agendas.
First, I present the theoretical framework of transnational advocacy networks through a literatura review, to highlight the importance of these agents in the international system, and expose the central position that NGOs occupy in that scenario, seeking to analyze the strategies of these organizations, in order to understand the limits of its political action. Second, I
investigate where Brazil stands regarding the Global Human Rights system 34 , and the preferences of the Brazilian diplomatic agenda during the Lula administration (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) . The hypothesis that NGOs play a necessary role for Brazilian foreign policy, as they represent civil society in the decision-making process, but that is not enough to cause a mere change of position in the Brazilian diplomatic agenda, because of the administration's preferences during the analyzed period.
Transnational Advocacy Networks and the role of Human Rights NGOs
In order to analyze NGOs impact on Brazilian foreign policy, it is necessary to outline the role of those organizations in the international system and their position within transnational advocacy networks, answering the following questions: 1) What are transnational advocacy networks? 2) What are their strategies? 3) How could they influence foreign policy? Only in that way, it is possible to investigate the limits of their political action.
34 "The Global Human Rights System, an amalgam of norms, standing institutions, global campaigns and funding" (Hopgood, 2014) .
~ 66 ~ This paper will use the contribution of Keck and Sikkink (1998) , Activists Beyond Borders, as the backbone of this section. The book is a seminal, interdisciplinary work on transnational advocacy networks and puts into perspective the role of these actors in influencing the foreign policy decision-making processes around the world and changing violating Human Rights practices. Other important contributions that will shape this section should be mentioned: the work of Richard Price (2003) , that does an extensive literature review on the role of transnational civil society advocacy in world politics; the essay by Hans Peter Schmitz (2010) that looks to "open the black box" of advocacy networks and explore their internal debates; and the work of Robert Charles Blitt (2004) on Human Rights NGOs' regulation. Keck and Sikkink (1998) call networks motivated by shared principles and values, transnational advocacy networks. According to the authors, advocacy networks grew increasingly larger and became more complex in the second half of the 20th century. Their goal is to build and deepen new links between states, international organizations and civil society. In order to do this, they make creative use of information and develop sophisticated strategies.
Florini calls transnational civil society the organized advocacy groups that take collective action without borders, fighting for what they believe to be the public interest (1999 apud Price, 2003) . Schmitz states that transnational Human Rights networks are those that represent "a form of collective cross-border action designed to promote compliance with universally accepted norms" and seek to hold governments accountable by exposing the gaps between their international commitments and their domestic conduct (2010: 1).
The term "transnational" implies that advocacy networks are participants in both domestic and international politics. In that sense, some of the key goals of advocacy networks are promoting the implementation of standards through the pressure they make on key actors, and monitoring, which verifies compliance with international standards. Thus, networks contribute to redirecting discursive positions, and eventually influencing changes in policy and behavior (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) .
Transnational network activists are united not only by shared principles and values but also by having a common discourse and by exchanging information and services with one another. Actors of activism networks include: international and domestic research and advocacy organizations, social movements, institutes or foundations, the media, churches, trade unions, intellectuals, parts of regional or local intergovernmental organizations, and sectors of the executive or legislative branch of a government (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) .
The position of nongovernmental organizations in advocacy networks is central. Human Rights NGOs, according to Blitt (2004) , are independent organizations that can operate at Finally, according to Keck and Sikkink (1998) When political entrepreneurs promote them; 3) At conferences or when other type of contact between activists happen (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Schmitz, 2010) .
In this sense, investigative research on the strategies of transnational advocacy networks
is the appropriate way to analyze their capacity for political action and their impact on changing not only the rhetorical positions, but also the behavior of states regarding Human Rights.
Transnational Advocacy Networks: strategies and influence
In order to analyze the strategies of transnational advocacy networks, it is necessary to emphasize that the political role of these organizations is outlined, mainly, by their campaigns.
According to Keck and Sikkink, campaigns are "strategically linked activities where members of a network develop bonds and mutually recognized roles in the pursuit of a common goal" (1998:
Campaigns are processes of construction of topics within certain contexts, with the objective of promoting substantive changes in an area, and the ones developed by Human Rights NGOs often focus on a country or a specific issue, such as torture or the death penalty.
According to Keck and Sikkink (1998) , the strategies of transnational advocacy networks can be divided into four categories: information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics.
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Vol. 4 No. 1 (September 2017) ~ 68 ~ Information politics are fundamental to a campaign. Keck and Sikkink argue that the ability to generate information quickly and effectively is "the most valuable trading currency" of NGOs, leveraging these organizations as legitimate international players. Information politics are expected to act on two fronts: they need to be reliable and attract attention (1998: 19) . Therefore, they must be both dramatic and technical, used in a timely context to persuade public and policymakers to act, using facts to inform and testimonials to portray the situation also in terms of human stories. In that sense, framing is an important component, looking for opportunities where conditions are most conducive to leverage the central issue of the campaign.
The second kind of strategy according to Keck and Sikkink (1998) is symbolic politics. This type of strategy appears when important events occur and are framed as symbolic in a way that they not only develop audience awareness but also broaden the foundations of advocacy networks. Therefore, activists use symbols, actions or stories to make sense of an issue, and facilitate the transmission of information using analogies (Blitt, 2004) .
The third type is leverage politics, when networks push more powerful actors, to change their policies or positions. Leverage politics occur mainly between activists and governments, financial institutions or other private actors. To be effective, NGOs need to raise their status through information and symbolic politics first, since organizations with more prominent profiles are more likely to succeed in lobbying for political change, and their legitimacy depends on their reputation as providers of objective expertise and reliable information (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) .
According to Blitt effective use of leverage politics "depends on the ability of NGOs to
[…] exploit the moral authority inherent in the rhetoric of Human Rights" (2004: 290) . There are two types of leverage politics: material (when Human Rights groups provide information about a violating country, and pressures an ally to cut off military or economic aid to this regime) and moral (through shaming, when a country is called to respond for Human Rights violations, believing that to discredit that regime internationally may motivate behavior change). Shaming frames the Human Rights violating state as an outcast, one that should be despised by the civilized international community (Blitt, 2004) .
The fourth and last type of strategy analyzed by Keck and Sikkink (1998) , accountability politics, is the monitoring of the promises made by countries. In other words, this type of strategy allows members of transnational advocacy networks to use previous positions and commitments made by a state as a way of exposing the differences between their discourse and practice, imputing responsibility or ensuring stated policies. Now that the strategies of transnational advocacy networks have been exposed, it is possible to analyze their political influence acting as organisms that seek to change discursive, political and behavioral positions of more powerful actors. Keck and Sikkink (1998) identify five stages or types of influence by networks: defining agendas, influencing discursive positions, influencing the institutional process, influencing policy change, and ultimately influencing the behavior of a state. The authors use the concept of stages of influence, not just types, because they believe that one change can impact the other, triggering an interconnected reaction, where governments are more prone to behavior change as they become more permeable to networks.
Because of this, countries that have made changes of discursive positions are more likely to commit to procedural changes, which can directly impact political changes. Therefore, significant changes are more likely in cases where other types of impact have already been achieved.
The effectiveness of the campaigns, however, depends on important issues. For example, many topics cannot achieve sufficient status to be leveraged by networks. That happens because, according to Keck and Sikkink (1998) , problems that can be associated with intentional actions of identifiable individuals have more potential to be chosen for campaigns than very structural and difficult to explain causes. The campaign can also depend on the characteristics of the actors (if they are vulnerable to moral and material constraints), as well as on the networks themselves (how strong they are) (Schmitz, 2010) .
Finally, Keck and Sikkink (1998) understand that it is fundamental to turn to the place that standards occupy in the relation between networks and states. Norms and practices are mutually constituted, but practices turn standards into reality. Keck and Sikkink (1998: 42) 
The Limits of Transnational Advocacy Networks Action
For the purpose of this paper, it is also necessary to discuss the limits of transnational advocacy networks action, so we can understand better their ability to impact on foreign policy.
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In addition, there are criticisms over NGOs structures, stating that they are not necessarily democratic and transparent, not representative of the public interest and may reflect disparities that exist in the international system (Blitt, 2004; Price, 2003) . These problems, according to Price, may directly affect the influence of these organizations, since "their power depends on their legitimacy as agents who deal with (rather than produce their own) democratic Another issue is that, although Keck and Sikkink (1998) work. In this sense, the boomerang effect must also be dismembered (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 17) .
The boomerang effect is treated by Keck and Sikkink as a phenomenon that happens when domestic groups go directly to the international arena to seek allies to contribute to pressure in their own country. The relationship established, according to the authors, is mutually beneficial: for domestic actors, usually from the Global South, access to information and influence is gained, while for the central actors, usually from the North, the notion created is that they not only fight for their peripheral partners, but with them (1998: 21).
However, it is necessary to better investigate this relationship. Keck and Sikkink (1998) themselves point out that Global North actors in advocacy networks have a cultural environment of optimistic internationalism. For the members of the networks located in the South, however, to justify an external intervention in domestic matters is a complex issue, since it stirs memories of the colonial/neocolonial era (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 23) . The apprehension is not without reason: the gap between the situation itself and the way it is portrayed by transnational advocacy groups often causes locals to lose control over how their stories will be told. 
Brazil and Human Rights
According to Blitt (2004) Additionally, Brazil has achieved an international status leveraged by its role as one of the main agents of the G20, for acting in forums such as BRICS and IBAS, and being a Global South voice for soft power. The new status highlights the country as one of the players to focus on international Human Rights debates. Therefore, many external observers have high expectations for Brazil in terms of defending Human Rights principles (Engstrom, 2014) . It is also possible to see this expectation in NGOs, which see Brazil as a mediator of regional issues, as a possible partner in promoting Human Rights in BRICS projects or as an important agent in the discussion of specific topics, such as Internet freedom 36 (Canineu and Donahoe, 2014) .
However, Engstrom (2014) understands that it is important to state the difference between the expectations that Brazil plays a more active role, particularly by international Human Rights NGOs, and the country's willingness to do so. The author understands that Brazil shows reluctance in criticizing the behavior of other countries on Human Rights, mainly because the principle of noninterference is deeply rooted in Brazilian foreign policy. I argue that Lula administration's preferences for South-South relations and cooperation is also a strong variable to consider.
In this sense, Brazilian diplomacy during the Lula administration classified the Global Human Rights system as "unjust (strong countries that criticize the weak), hypocritical (selectively applied norms) and ineffective (diplomatic shame does not improve Human Rights in the country accused of violations)" (Engstrom, 2014: 17 
Brazil: an ally of human rights violators?
Brazil faced several criticisms regarding its ties with regimes that violate Human Rights during Lula's administration. These criticisms were manifested on two fronts: on the one hand, the mainstream media condemned what it calls condescension with regimes that were considered authoritarian. On the other hand, activists and members of civil society organizations reinforce that although Brazil has advanced in several fronts 37 of the development agenda (directly linked to economic, social and cultural rights), the country's performance in the international arena remains ambiguous regarding certain regimes accused of systematic violating
Human Rights (Milani, 2011) . with countries accused of Human Rights violations, contrary to the strategy of international constraint, but reinforcing that "the lack of firm reaction of the international community can be dangerously understood as a carte blanche to the dictatorships of today". Brazil also faced attacks because it abstained or voted against resolutions against Cuba, Sri Lanka, North Korea, and other regions and countries considered systematic Human Rights violators. Regionally, the criticisms were focused on the position of the Brazilian diplomacy not to publicly express any position that could undermine the country's relationship with Cuba and Venezuela (Engstrom, 2014) .
Thus, it is worth mentioning the speech of Minister Celso Amorim on the case of Equatorial Guinea, to illustrate how Human Rights and strategic interests can conflict in a bilateral scenario between Brazil and an ally. During Lula's visit to the country, ruled by the same dictator since 1979, Amorim stated that "business is business" (Asano and Nader, 2011: 124 Equatorial Guinea (Asano and Nader, 2011 ). Brazil appears as a Human Rights supporter at the rhetorical level, while its performance is located in a gray area, where relativisms can occur and strategic interests, such as commercial opportunities and support for the Brazilian campaign for a permanent seat in the Secuity Council of the United Nations, are more important for the country, or as Asano and Nader state, "on several occasions, the limit between dialogue, discretion and cooperation, and omission and connivance, has been tenuous" (2011: 123).
However, it should be made clear that, while the criticisms made by these Human Rights organizations are valid, it is also necessary to address not only the selectivity practiced by states, in terms of putting the spotlight on countries because of strategic interests and political preferences, but also the selectivity of NGOs in reporting violations.
First, the shaming of transnational Human Rights organizations is directed mainly at violators, with criticism of countries considered supporters or allies of the accused regime appearing only as a coadjutvant issue. More than that, some studies prove that NGOs often produce publications or news stories about some countries more than others because they seek to maximize opportunities for advocacy, funding, public support and media attention. NGOs, however, recognize that selectivity is a problem for Human Rights only at the diplomatic level. They do record that Brazil should criticize the selective use of Human Rights and be concerned about it being used as a political weapon by the Global North countries to condemn their opponents' violations and conveniently shut up about allies' violations and their own (Milani, 2011) , but NGOs also note that Brazil cannot fall into the same trap by quelling in the face of systematic Human Rights violations of its allies. 
Discussion
Nongovernmental organizations not only exist as agents of transnational advocacy networks, but as actors interacting in the international environment, whose initiatives contribute to the formulation of foreign policy domestically. According to Krain (2012) , the shaming strategy used by these organisms as a pressure tool to change countries' behavior and positions on Human Rights is an important method of addressing violations. (Engstrom, 2014) .
With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, it is also important to highlight what Schmitz (2010) understands as a trend for human rights NGOs to seek new alliances with humanitarian and development groups, noting that this change may be the beginning of a transformation where organizations move to a position of fighting against the structural causes of violations, such as ethnic divisions and competition for resources. In this sense, Brazil's domestic experiences with the promotion of economic and social rights can generate important opportunities to promote effective policies beyond its borders. An effort in this direction can be seen in the internationalization of public policies to combat hunger and poverty implemented by the Lula administration, such as Fome Zero (Fraundorfer, 2013) .
Future research could also focus on Brazil as a major international player for Human Rights issues when it comes to linking the idea of development to economic and social rights, fighting for a less reactive role of transnational NGOs, and promoting preventive activism, that attacks the structural causes of violations, not just a reactive one, which reports violations that have already occurred and are based on shaming to impact on the policies and behavior of countries.
Conclusion
The main goal for this paper was to present an introduction on the relationship between Brazilian foreign policy during the Lula administration (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) and Human Rights NGOs who advocate against the "friendly" relationship between Brazil and Human Rights violating regimes. In that sense, the first thing to notice is that NGOs are necessary actors in the decisionmaking process of Brazilian foreign policy, representing civil society on important debates regarding Human Rights and promoting the democratization of a process that was, until very recently, mainly focused on the actions of Itamaraty, the Ministry of Foreign Relations. In that sense, I argue that Brazilian foreign policy, as a public policy, benefits from contributions made by nonstate actors that represent civil society.
Secondly, it's important to highlight that, Lula's diplomatic agenda not only followed fundamental principles of Brazilian foreign policy (like multilateralism and non-intervention) but also showed a preference for South-South connections, and a clear prioritization of Brazil's strategic interests, such as commercial opportunities and support for the country's campaign for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, over shared international principles.
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During the Lula administration, the "business as usual" approach dominated Brazilian foreign policy regarding bilateral relations with countries accused of systematic Human Rights violations, and shaming by NGOs did not appear as a factor of influence in changing positions.
Strategic interests still appeared as the agent that leverages more consistent changes. Therefore, shaming would appear as a relevant factor in specific cases, only when it contributes to the understanding that, by continuing to collaborate with a Human Rights violating country, Brazil may undermine its strategic goals in the long run.
